Paying For Reuse: A Scoping Review Of How Extended Producer Responsibility Can Finance Reusable Packaging In Developing Countries

The report “Paying for reuse: a scoping review of how extended producer responsibility can finance reusable packaging in developing countries” by Bintang Ekananda (2026) examines how Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) policy can be redesigned to actively fund and govern reusable packaging systems in low- and middle-income countries.

Here are the key takeaways:

1. The Disconnect Between EPR and Reuse

• EPR was built for recycling, not reuse: As developing countries rapidly adopt mandatory EPR rules to curb plastic waste, current frameworks treat reusable packaging primarily as a way for producers to lower or exempt what they owe, rather than a system that EPR revenue should actively finance.
• Thin evidence base: Out of 143 reviewed literature sources, only 14 examine reuse alongside EPR or deposit-refund schemes, and none examine how EPR can finance reuse in a developing country.
• Lack of dedicated funding: Across the eight analyzed jurisdictions (Indonesia, India, the Philippines, Vietnam, Chile, Kenya, South Africa, and the EU), only South Africa explicitly permits EPR scheme revenue to be spent on reuse measures.

2. Five Key Design Tensions

The report identifies five fundamental mismatches between single-use EPR design assumptions and the real-world operational needs of reuse systems:

1. Unit of Obligation: Traditional EPR charges producers per tonne placed on the market each year^[9]. A reusable container is placed once but incurs recurring costs per trip (washing, reverse logistics, retail handling).
2. Metrics: Performance is measured in recycled or recovered weight, ignoring critical reuse metrics like return rates, trips per container, and loss rates.
3. Fee Modulation: Fee modulation criteria focus almost exclusively on recyclability rather than reusability.
4. Eligible Use of Funds: Scheme funds pay for collection, sorting, and recycling, leaving washing hubs, container pools, and retailer working capital unfunded.
5. Recognized Actors: EPR schemes contract formal recyclers and waste pickers, but omit neighborhood retailers (e.g., small shops/warung) and refill operators who act as the actual return and refill nodes in local communities.

3. Fee Structure & Producer Incentives

Through an economic fee model, the author compares four ways to price reusable packaging under EPR.

• Weight-based fees penalize new reusable systems—because reusable containers are heavier than single-use packs—until high return rates are achieved.
• Threshold exemptions (exempting producers once a return threshold is met) eliminate the penalty, but also remove any financial incentive to push return rates higher.
• Proposed Solution — Loss-Based Fees: The author proposes charging producers only for lost containers from a verified reuse system at the single-use rate. This ensures reusable packaging remains cheaper per sale than single-use packaging at any positive return rate, rewards every extra trip, and embeds individual producer responsibility into collective schemes.

4. “Embedded Reuse” & Policy Recommendations

To scale reuse in low- and middle-income markets, policy must embrace embedded reuse—building on everyday community structures:

• Ring-fence PRO revenue: Reserve a dedicated portion of Producer Responsibility Organization (PRO) revenue specifically for shared washing hubs and logistics infrastructure.
• Pay neighborhood retailers: Pay local shops and community waste banks a fee per container handled as return points, rather than relying solely on upfront cash deposits that deter low-income households.
• Clarity on hygiene and credits: Establish clear national standards for food, home care, and cosmetics refill hygiene to reduce legal uncertainty, and keep reuse credits separate from cheaper plastic collection offsets to prevent double counting.